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Method of Attack: A Supplemental Model for 
Hate Crime Analysis 
ANGELA D. MOORE* 
INTRODUCTION 
On October 28, 2009, the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes 
Prevention Act (HCPA) was signed into law by President Barack Obama.1 Two years 
later, between September and November of 2011, members of a Bergholz, Ohio, 
Amish community allegedly carried out five attacks in which they forcibly 
restrained, and cut the hair and beards of, members of other Amish communities.2 In 
September of 2012, a jury rendered a verdict in United States v. Mullet and found 
sixteen members of the Bergholz community—including Samuel Mullet, bishop of 
the community—guilty of HCPA violations.3 These were the first convictions for 
religion-based hate crimes under the new statute.4 
Under the HCPA, a hate crime is committed when someone “willfully causes 
bodily injury to any person . . . because of the actual or perceived religion, national 
origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability of any person. . . .”5 
At trial, the judge instructed the jury that the “because of” requirement could be proven 
by showing that the victim’s religion was “a significant motivating factor.”6 In 2014, 
while Mullet was awaiting decision on appeal, the Supreme Court decided Burrage v. 
United States and noted that, especially in the interpretation of criminal statutes, which 
are subject to the rule of lenity, the causation standards “because of,” “based on,” and 
“results from” have the ordinary meaning of requiring but-for causation.7 
All three judges on the appellate panel in Mullet agreed that the district court’s 
jury instruction that the victims’ religion must have been a “significant factor” in the 
motivation for the attacks was incorrect and should have comported with the Burrage 
holding.8 The judges split two to one, however, regarding the disposition of the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 * J.D. candidate, 2015, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. 
 1. Pub. L. No. 111-84, §§ 4701–13, 123 Stat. 2190, 2835–44 (2009) (rider to the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010). 
 2. United States v. Miller, 767 F.3d 585, 589 (6th Cir. 2014). While the Amish identity 
of the Bergholz group is debated, the community has not renounced the label. With wide 
diversity among the Amish as a result of minimal church hierarchy, it is difficult to show that, 
despite their irregularities, the community is not Amish. See infra note 27. 
 3. Verdict Forms, United States v. Mullet, 868 F. Supp. 2d 618 (N.D. Ohio 2012) (No. 
5:11 CR 594), 2012 WL 7089376, rev’d sub nom. United States v. Miller, 767 F.3d 585 (6th 
Cir. 2014) [hereinafter Verdict Forms]. Although the case was captioned United States v. 
Miller on appeal, this Note refers to the case at all of its stages as Mullet. 
 4. DONALD B. KRAYBILL, RENEGADE AMISH: BEARD CUTTING, HATE CRIMES, AND THE 
TRIAL OF THE BERGHOLZ BARBERS ix–x (2014). 
 5. 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)(A) (2012). 
 6. Miller, 767 F.3d at 591 (emphasis omitted). 
 7. Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881, 889–91 (2014). 
 8. See Miller, 767 F.3d at 589; id. at 603–04 (Sargus, J., dissenting). For an argument 
against extending the Burrage requirement of but-for causation to antidiscrimination statutes, 
including the HCPA, see Aaron J. Creuz, New Development, But-For the Beard: An Analysis 
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appeal. The majority opinion, written by Judge Sutton, remanded the case to the 
district court and held that, because the motivation behind the attacks was at issue, a 
new trial—this time using the proper causation standard—is necessary.9 In dissent, 
Judge Sargus would not have remanded the case because using the incorrect 
causation standard was harmless error.10 The defense did not establish that the 
method of attack would have been the same if the victims had not been Amish 
adherents. Thus, using the incorrect causation standard was harmless error.11 
There are three commonly used models of causation for hate crime statutes: 
“racial animus,” “discriminatory selection,” and “because of.”12 The “because of” 
construction is the most ambiguous model—because the “because of” language is 
consistent with the analysis under either of the other models13—and is the model 
used in the HCPA.14 Judge Sargus’s dissent would expand “because of” to include a 
new model for hate crime analysis: method of attack.15 This expansion serves the 
purposes of protecting classes from fear of attack due to their class membership and 
of giving heightened punishment to those who decide to perpetrate a crime based on 
protected characteristics. This new model of hate crime analysis ought to be adopted 
as a supplemental means of showing that a protected class member was attacked 
“because of” his or her class membership. If adopted, this supplemental analysis 
would recognize that, even assuming the Mullet victims were not chosen because of 
their religion, the attackers still made decisions based on the victims’ religion. 
In this Note, Part I provides an overview of facets of the Amish faith relevant to 
understanding the conflict between the defendants and the victims in Mullet. Part II 
recounts the conflicts and attacks and then looks to the litigation of the case from 
trial through appeal. Part III briefly recounts the HCPA’s namesakes and legislative 
history and presents the different models for hate crime statutes and their 
corresponding analyses, including Judge Sargus’s expanded interpretation of 
“because of.” Part IV argues that when, but for the victim’s protected class, an 
inherently class-based method of attack would not have been selected, the “because 
of” requirement of the HCPA should be deemed satisfied. 
                                                                                                                 
 
of Causation Under United States Code Section 249, 16 RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION 200 (2014). 
This argument is in line with Justice Ginsburg’s concurring opinion in Burrage. See Creuz, 
supra, at 202; see also Burrage, 134 S. Ct. at 892 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 9. Id. at 602. After the defendants were resentenced following the appeal, the 
prosecution filed notice that it would not seek retrial on the convictions overturned by the 
Sixth Circuit. Notice to Court of Government’s Decision Not to Retry the Defendants of 
Substantive Hate Crimes Offenses, United States v. Mullet, 868 F. Supp. 2d 618 (N.D. Ohio 
2012) (No. 5:11 CR 594), ECF No. 645, rev’d sub nom. United States v. Miller, 767 F.3d 585 
(6th Cir. 2014). 
 10. Id. at 603 (Sargus, J., dissenting). Judge Sargus, a district court judge for the Southern 
District of Ohio, sat on the panel by designation. Id. at 588. 
 11. Id. 605 (Sargus, J., dissenting). 
 12. See Jacob A. Ramer, Hate by Association: Joint Criminal Enterprise Liability for 
Persecution, 7 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L. 31, 93 (2007). 
 13. FREDERICK M. LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE: BIAS CRIMES UNDER AMERICAN LAW 
37 (1999). 
 14. See infra text accompanying notes 133–35. 
 15. See infra text accompanying notes 137–40. 
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I. UNDERSTANDING THE AMISH 
Whether due to the romance of the “otherness” of the plain Amish lifestyle,16 the 
bizarre demands Bishop Samuel Mullet made of his flock,17 or the unique method of 
attack, the beard-cutting attacks received international attention from the first reports 
of the attacks through the verdict and appeal.18 The dispute between the Bergholz 
community and the wider Amish church, as well as the violent actions the Bergholz 
defendants took in response to it, are atypical of the Amish faith.19 Aspects of the 
Amish faith that are salient to a better understanding of the context surrounding the 
events at issue are clarified below. 
A. Historical Formation 
The Amish belong to a Christian subgroup called Anabaptists that began as a 
result of the Radical Reformation, an offshoot of the Protestant Reformation, in the 
sixteenth century.20 Distinguishing characteristics of the Anabaptist movement were 
viewing Christianity as discipleship, meaning they expected internal faith to have an 
external effect on adherents’ lives; voluntary church membership, which led the 
Anabaptist reformers to be rebaptized as adults and not baptize children;21 and an 
ethic of love that led to the Anabaptist stance of pacifism.22 Around the turn of the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 16. See DONALD B. KRAYBILL, THE RIDDLE OF AMISH CULTURE xi–xiii (rev. ed. 2001). 
 17. These demands included requiring “the men to demonstrate their devotion to him by 
giving up their wives. He expect[ed] the women to leave their families—husbands, children, 
and all—to live with him, to have sex with him, and to learn from him how to satisfy their 
husbands.” United States v. Mullet, 868 F. Supp. 2d 618, 621 (N.D. Ohio 2012). Mullet’s 
demands also included confining members of his congregation to “Amish jails”—dog kennels, 
goat pens, or chicken coops—for offenses such as “having dirty thoughts.” KRAYBILL, supra 
note 4, at 68–70. At least two men incurred frostbite injuries during their “sentences.” Id. at 69. 
 18. See, e.g., John Seewer, Amish Woman Testifies Against Bishop, IOL NEWS (Aug. 30, 
2012), http://www.iol.co.za/news/world/amish-woman-testifies-against-bishop-1.1373099#.Us
HNbrQVU0Y (S. Afr.); Adam Zwi, Hate Crimes and Ohio’s ‘Renegade Amish,’ AUSTRALIAN 
BROADCASTING CORP. (Nov. 10, 2014), http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs
/latenightlive/hate-crimes-and-ohios-renegade-amish/5879174 (Austl.); Beards and Hair Shorn 
in Amish-on-Amish Attacks, BBC NEWS (Oct. 7, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us
-canada-15219225 (U.K.); Religionsstreit in Amerika: Bartklau in Christensekte – FBI nimmt 
Verdächtige fest [Religious Dispute in America: Beard Removal in Christian Sect – FBI Arrests 
Suspects], DER SPIEGEL (Nov. 24, 2011), http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/gesellschaft/religionsstreit
-in-amerika-bartklau-in-christensekte-fbi-nimmt-verdaechtige-fest-a-799720.html (Ger.). 
 19. Donald Kraybill, an expert on the Amish, compiled a list of twenty-five practices of 
the Bergholz Amish group that were atypical of Amish congregations, including “[c]ondoning 
physical punishment to discipline adults,” “[r]ejecting a Christian identity,” and [m]aking 
death threats to law enforcement officers.” KRAYBILL, supra note 4, at 139. 
 20. KRAYBILL, supra note 16, at 3–4. 
 21. JOHN A. HOSTETLER, AMISH SOCIETY 26 (4th ed. 1993). The term “Anabaptist” 
literally means “rebaptizer.” Anabaptism, GLOBAL ANABAPTIST MENNONITE ENCYCLOPEDIA 
ONLINE (last modified Dec. 1, 2014), http://gameo.org/index.php?title=Anabaptism. 
 22. See HAROLD S. BENDER, THE ANABAPTIST VISION 31–33 (1944). 
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eighteenth century, Jakob Ammann and his followers broke away from the Swiss 
Anabaptists; Ammann’s group became known as the Amish.23 
Before the split, Ammann tried to reform the Anabaptist church, wanting 
excommunicated members to be shunned completely—that is, he wanted to impose 
social avoidance of the excommunicated in addition to removal from church 
fellowship.24 Unable to achieve this reformation, Ammann excommunicated several 
Swiss Anabaptist leaders, creating an irreconcilable divide and splitting the 
Anabaptists into two groups: Amish and Mennonite.25 In addition to teaching social 
avoidance of excommunicated members, Ammann “taught against trimming beards, 
rebuked those with fashionable dress, and administered a strict discipline in his 
congregations.”26 The Amish have retained many of Ammann’s tenets in their 
religious practice. 
B. Current State and Structure 
There are over 2100 Amish congregations and around forty “affiliations”—
groups of Amish congregations.27 The bishop is the spiritual leader of an Amish 
                                                                                                                 
 
 23. See John A. Hostetler, The Amish Use of Symbols and Their Function in Bounding 
the Community, 94 J. ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST. GR. BRIT. & IR. 11, 11 (1964). 
 24. KRAYBILL, supra note 16, at 7–8. 
 25. Id. at 8. 
 26. Id. 
 27. KRAYBILL, supra note 4, at 17. Ohio, home to the Bergholz community and all of the 
victims in Mullet, has approximately 500 Amish congregations with a total membership of 
over 60,000—about twenty-three percent of the total North American Amish population. Id. 
at 170. Whether the Bergholz community itself is Amish is debatable, especially in light of its 
many irregular practices, such as cessation of worship services, denouncing a Christian 
identity, and rejecting the counsel of other Amish ministers. See id. at 139. Furthermore, 
Amish in other communities have spoken out, declaring that “[the Bergholz community is] 
not Amish anymore, they just dress Amish” and that “Sam Mullet’s behavior violates the core 
of Amish faith . . . . His behavior is so contrary to the Amish faith.” Id. at 138 (quoting 
interviews with an unidentified Amish preacher and unidentified Amish bishop, respectively). 
An Amish scholar affirms these opinions: “They removed themselves from the Amish world 
when they stopped having church services.” Id. (quoting correspondence with an unidentified 
Amish scholar). This scholar’s opinion raises the interesting issue of the nature of “being 
Amish”: is it an ethnicity, a culture, a religion, or some combination of these elements? Id. at 
138; see also HOSTETLER, supra note 21, at 10 (“Amish life is distinctive in that religion and 
custom blend into a way of life. The two are inseparable.”). Congress, also aware that lines 
can become blurry, noted as a finding of fact regarding the HCPA that some religions were 
regarded as races at the time the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments were 
ratified. Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 4702(8), 123 Stat. 2190, 2836 (2009). Ultimately, the local 
autonomy enjoyed by each congregation, absence of written documents of governance, lack 
of enforceable regulations regarding church names, and lack of trademark protection of the 
term “Amish” make it difficult to say that the Bergholz community (despite its irregularities) 
is not Amish. KRAYBILL, supra note 4, at 137–41. In any case, the HCPA covers crimes 
committed because of the victim’s religion, not the perpetrator’s religion, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 249(a)(2)(A) (2012), and intragroup violence is not exempt from the HCPA’s reach, see 
infra notes 93–94 and accompanying text. As a consequence, whether the Bergholz 
community is properly categorized as an Amish group need not be resolved. 
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congregation, though two or three ministers and a deacon may also serve the 
congregation.28 Amish bishops are “the incarnate symbol[s] of church authority”; the 
personality of the bishop will greatly influence how the congregation interprets 
church doctrine as well as the lifestyle requirements made of the congregation.29 
Without a central, pope-like leader, there is great diversity between Amish 
congregations: different Amish affiliations have different colors of buggy tops or 
have uncovered buggies, and individual congregations may or may not allow “cell 
phones, indoor plumbing, power lawnmowers, LED lights, and fax machines.”30 
Despite this diversity, “one constant is the beard. All Amish men sport this public 
symbol of cultural and religious identity. . . . Beard wearing is so firmly entrenched 
in Amish tradition that it rarely needs to be justified or encouraged.”31 
C. Cultural and Religious Symbolism of Hair and Beards 
The distinct, plain mode of Amish dress is due to their strict rules regarding 
personal appearance. An Amish woman’s hair “must be long and uncut, parted in the 
middle only, and combed down the sides.”32 For men, “[t]he beard must begin to 
appear at baptism for Amish men though the young men during the courtship period 
manage to keep it very short. At marriage they dare no longer to trim it.”33 Socially, 
the beard of an Amish man and hair of an Amish woman symbolize the wearer’s 
identity as a member of the faith; “[t]he language of dress [including hair and beard 
fashion] forms a common understanding and mutual appreciation among those who 
share the same heritage.”34 
Restrictions on hair and beard styling have a religious meaning as well. 
Submitting to community standards is a facet of the Amish religious principle of 
Gelassenheit (“yieldedness” or “inner surrender”)35, a complex idea that 
encompasses nonresistance and the refusal to serve in armed forces.36 Furthermore, 
the trimming or shaving of a man’s beard and cutting of a woman’s hair are forbidden 
                                                                                                                 
 
 28. KRAYBILL, supra note 16, at 94. 
 29. Id. 
 30. KRAYBILL, supra note 4, at 17. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Hostetler, supra note 23, at 13. 
 33. Id. Showing once again that individual congregations have discretion concerning rules 
in their own communities, Donald Kraybill notes instead: 
Men shave until marriage, at which time they grow a beard, which serves the 
symbolic function of a wedding ring . . . and as a rite of passage to manhood . . . . 
An untrimmed, full beard from ear to ear is encouraged for adult men; however, 
many trim their beards for neatness. 
KRAYBILL, supra note 16, at 63. In any case, the principle remains that there are rules within 
Amish communities governing how an Amish man is to wear his beard. 
 34. Hostetler, supra note 23, at 18. 
 35. Robert Friedmann, Anabaptism and Protestantism, 24 MENNONITE Q. REV. 12, 22 
& n.17 (1950). 
 36. See KRAYBILL, supra note 16, at 29–32, 66. This principle also leads Amish men to 
shave their upper lips, a practice that began contemporaneous with, and likely in response to, 
the popularity among French soldiers of wearing moustaches without beards. See Hostetler, 
supra note 23, at 13. 
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because these mandatory grooming standards are clear demarcations of the sexes;37 
most alterations of a woman’s natural hair are seen as blasphemous attempts to 
improve upon God’s creation.38 The Amish also find biblical support for their 
requirements of beard wearing for men and uncut hair for women.39 
D. Church Discipline 
Discipline of members in the Amish church can be severe, but the Bergholz 
attacks on members of other Amish congregations are a clear departure from normal 
Amish practice.40 The most extreme form of church discipline in the Amish faith is 
the Bann—excommunication.41 As the namesake of the Amish, Jakob Ammann, 
taught, the Bann includes social avoidance—commonly known as shunning or 
Meidung—in addition to religious exclusion.42 Outlined in a 1632 confession of faith 
that the Amish still follow,43 there are two motivations for imposing the Bann: purity 
of the congregation and reformation of the errant member.44 Retribution and revenge 
are not proper reasons for church discipline.45 At its core and as it is intended, church 
discipline—including the Bann—is not imposed because of hatred; it is done to 
convince those punished to return to the church.46 Instead of hate, love is central to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 37. KRAYBILL, supra note 4, at 18 (citing Elmo Stoll, The War of the Whiskers, FAMILY 
LIFE, Aug.–Sept. 1983, at 8–10). 
 38. See KRAYBILL, supra note 16, at 60. This prohibition extends to “curling hair, shaving 
legs, and trimming eyebrows.” Id. 
 39. KRAYBILL, supra note 4, at 18–19. An Amish manual notes that “to have one’s beard 
cut was humiliation (II Sam. 10:4, 5), a form of punishment (Isa. 7:20), or a mark of sorrow 
and distress, the same as wearing sackcloth (Isa. 15:2; Jer. 48:37).” 1001 QUESTIONS AND 
ANSWERS ON THE CHRISTIAN LIFE 137 (1992), quoted in KRAYBILL, supra note 4, at 18–19. 
 40. See KRAYBILL, supra note 4, at 137–39. 
 41. KRAYBILL, supra note 16, at 135–37. 
 42. HOSTETLER, supra note 21, at 85. It is worth noting that many portrayals of Amish 
shunning in popular culture are inaccurate. See VALERIE WEAVER-ZERCHER, THRILL OF THE 
CHASTE 206–09 (2013) (noting the inaccurate portrayal of shunning—with regard to 
frequency, method, and triggering actions—in Amish romance novels). Communication is 
permitted between those under the Bann and members in good standing. KRAYBILL, supra note 
16, at 138. Shunning creates a “one-way relationship” in which members in good standing 
“are encouraged to help, assist, and visit” those shunned, but a shunned person may not help 
the member in good standing. Id. “[M]embers may not shake hands or accept anything directly 
from the offender.” Id. 
 43. See KRAYBILL, supra note 16, at 28. 
 44. See Dordrecht Confession of Faith (Mennonite, 1632), GLOBAL ANABAPTIST 
MENNONITE ENCYCLOPEDIA ONLINE (last modified Dec. 19, 2014), http://gameo.org/index.php
?title=Dordrecht_Confession_of_Faith_%28Mennonite,_1632%29 [hereinafter Dordrecht 
Confession]. 
 45. Additionally, “[s]hunning does not reflect personal animosity. . . .” KRAYBILL, supra 
note 16, at 138. 
 46. Article Seventeen of the Confession clarifies the motivation behind shunning in the 
Anabaptist tradition: 
Concerning the withdrawing from, or shunning the separated . . . if any one, 
either through his wicked life or perverted doctrine, has so far fallen that he is 
separated from God . . . the same must, according to the doctrine of Christ and 
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the disciplinary process; it is hoped that, through loving reproof, disciplined 
members will repent and return.47 
II. ATTACKS, CONFLICT, AND LITIGATION 
Acrimony between the Bergholz community and the victims—whether caused by 
religion or not—led to five attacks in the fall of 2011 and the arrest of the sixteen 
defendants.48 From September 6 to November 9, 2011, members of the Bergholz 
community carried out the attacks on a total of nine individuals.49 The attackers 
forcibly restrained their victims and used horse mane shears and clippers to cut off 
the men’s beards and one female victim’s hair.50 None of the defendants were 
convicted for the September 24 attack on David Wengerd.51 Details of the four 
attacks that resulted in convictions, the possible causes motivating the attacks, and 
the resulting litigation are provided below. 
A. Attacks 
The first attack, occurring late on September 6, was perpetrated against Martin 
and Barbara Miller—brother-in-law and sister to Bishop Mullet—at their home 
three counties north of Bergholz.52 They were attacked by their children and 
children’s spouses, leaving both of them shorn and bruised and Martin bleeding 
and razor burned.53 
                                                                                                                 
 
His apostles, be shunned . . . by all the fellow members of the church . . . and no 
company be had with him that they may not become contaminated by intercourse 
with him, nor made partakers of his sins; but that the sinner may be made 
ashamed, pricked in his heart, and convicted in his conscience, unto his 
reformation. 
Dordrecht Confession, supra note 44. 
 47. The Confession also clarifies the proper attitude of the congregation toward those 
under the Bann: 
Therefore, we must not count them as enemies, but admonish them as 
brethren, that thereby they may be brought to a knowledge of and to repentance 
and sorrow for their sins, so that they may become reconciled to God, and 
consequently be received again into the church, and that love may continue with 
them, according as is proper. 
Id. 
 48. United States v. Miller, 767 F.3d 585, 589–90 (6th Cir. 2014). Though the appeal 
reversed the convictions for the Bergholz defendants, “[n]o one questions that the assaults 
occurred, and only a few defendants question their participation in them. The central issue at 
trial was whether the defendants committed the assaults ‘because of’ the religion of the 
victims.” Id. at 589. 
 49. Id. at 590. 
 50. See Government’s Sentencing Memorandum as to All Defendants at 3–4, United 
States v. Mullet, 868 F. Supp. 2d 618 (N.D. Ohio 2012) (No. 5:11 CR 594). 
 51. Brief for the United States as Appellee at 10, United States v. Miller, 767 F.3d 585 
(No. 13-3177); Verdict Forms, supra note 3. 
 52. KRAYBILL, supra note 4, at 3. 
 53. Id. at 4–5; Brief for the United States as Appellee, supra note 51, at 30–31. 
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Two more attacks happened on October 4. The first targeted Holmes County, Ohio 
Bishop Raymond Hershberger at his home.54 Samuel Mullet’s son Johnny—himself a 
Bergholz preacher55—led the attack.56 The Bergholz members held Bishop 
Hershberger down, and, using horse shears and hair clippers, trimmed his chest-length 
beard to within an inch of his chin, removed chunks of his head hair, and left him 
bleeding.57 The second attack of the evening was against Myron Miller,58 a young 
Amish bishop.59 Myron lost all but one and a half inches of his beard in the attack.60 
The final attack occurred on November 9 against Melvin and Anna Shrock at the 
Bergholz home of their son Emanuel, who was married to one of Samuel Mullet’s 
daughters.61 Melvin and Anna were wary of the invitation they received—via U.S. 
mail—to visit their son, but after alerting local police of their intended visit and 
receiving assurance from Emanuel of their safety, the Shrocks visited their son.62 
Two of Melvin’s grandsons held him down while Emanuel cut his hair and beard—
injuring his cheek in the process—and daughter-in-law Linda grabbed Anna to keep 
her from alerting the police.63 
B. Conflict 
1. The Prosecution’s Argument 
The prosecution in Mullet contended that the dispute between the Bergholz 
community and the wider Amish church began when a gathering of Amish bishops 
in Pennsylvania decided to overrule Bishop Mullet’s decision to place families who 
had left his congregation under the Bann.64 The bishops decided that placing those 
members under the Bann was not in line with Amish theology.65 Given the 
autonomy usually enjoyed by individual bishops and congregations in the Amish 
faith,66 this decision was a shocking break from precedent, which—according to 
the prosecution—provoked Mullet and the other defendants to retaliate in the form 
                                                                                                                 
 
 54. Brief for the United States as Appellee, supra note 51, at 34.  
 55. KRAYBILL, supra note 4, at 28. 
 56. Id. at 9. 
 57. Brief for the United States as Appellee, supra note 51, at 35, 37; KRAYBILL, supra 
note 4, at 9–10. 
 58. Myron Miller is not related to any of the other Millers heretofore mentioned. 
KRAYBILL, supra note 4, at 11. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 12. 
 61. Brief for the United States as Appellee, supra note 51, at 42; KRAYBILL, supra note 
4, at 14. 
 62. Brief for the United States as Appellee, supra note 51, at 43–44; KRAYBILL, supra 
note 4, at 14. 
 63. Brief for the United States as Appellee, supra note 51, at 45; KRAYBILL, supra note 
4, at 14. 
 64. Brief for the United States as Appellee, supra note 51, at 112. 
 65. Id. at 23–24. 
 66. See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text. 
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of beard- and hair-cutting attacks against those who stood against Bergholz on 
religious grounds.67 
Martin and Barbara Miller’s children in the Bergholz community called their 
parents hypocrites, and Martin and Barbara left the Bergholz community for religious 
reasons after a short tenure there.68 The prosecution deemed the attack “ritualistic 
religious violence.”69 During the attack on Bishop Raymond Hershberger, but before 
shaving Hershberger’s hair and beard, Johnny Mullet confirmed that Hershberger 
had taken part in the Pennsylvania meeting that overruled Samuel Mullet’s 
decisions.70 Though Hershberger’s son Andy did not press charges, the attackers 
started to remove his beard after noting “[y]ou’re a preacher as well.”71 Bishop 
Myron Miller had given sanctuary to Samuel Mullet’s son Bill and Bill’s family after 
Bill broke fellowship with his father and was placed under the Bann by Mullet.72 
Bishop Miller’s religious offense was not honoring Bergholz’s Bann.73 Melvin and 
Anna Shrock were former members of the Bergholz community and had been placed 
under the Bann after Melvin raised concerns about Mullet’s leadership.74 The 
defendants plotted to lure Melvin and Anna to Bergholz in order to cut Melvin’s hair 
because he was “against Sam Mullet,” the religious leader of Bergholz.75 
2. The Defense’s Rebuttal 
The defense, on the other hand, presented the attacks in nonreligious contexts.76 
After all, church discipline within the Amish faith employs the Bann, not physical 
attack, as its most severe form.77 Acts perpetrated against religious people need not 
be motivated by the victims’ religion.78 For example, the defense asserted that the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 67. John Seewer, Amish Shunning is Central to Ohio Hate Crime Trial, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(Sept. 15, 2012), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/amish-shunning-central-ohio-hate-crime-trial. 
Mullet himself did not actually participate in any of the attacks but was convicted for his 
involvement as the ringleader of the group and his approval and encouragement of the attacks. 
See Government’s Sentencing Memorandum as to All Defendants, supra note 50, at 8–11. 
Regarding the other bishops’ actions, Mullet said, “[t]hey changed the rulings of our church here, 
and they’re trying to force their way down our throat, make us do like they want us to do, and 
we’re not going to do that.” FBI Arrests 7 Amish on Hate Crimes Charges, CBS NEWS (Nov. 24, 
2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/fbi-arrests-7-amish-on-hate-crimes-charges/. 
 68. Brief for the United States as Appellee, supra note 51, at 25–26. The Millers had 
moved to Bergholz in order to be near their family and to try to heal the family rift. Id. 
 69. Id. at 27. 
 70. See id. at 34–35. 
 71. Id. at 36 (emphasis added). 
 72. Id. at 39. 
 73. Id. at 113 n.33. 
 74. Id. at 42. 
 75. Id. at 43 (quoting the trial transcript). 
 76. United States v. Miller, 767 F.3d 585, 594 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 77. See supra Part I.D. 
 78. After all, as the Supreme Court has recognized that atheism enjoys Religion Clause 
protection, it appears that all victims have some degree of protected religious beliefs—even if 
the beliefs are atheistic. See Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 703 (1994) (noting that 
a “principle at the heart of the Establishment Clause” is “that government should not prefer 
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attack on Martin and Barbara Miller—perpetrated exclusively by close relatives—
was the result of family discord.79 The parents had long disrespected their children 
at Bergholz: they refused to attend their son Raymond’s wedding at Bergholz, 
withheld financial help when their son-in-law Freeman Burkholder was at risk of 
losing his home, refused to welcome their daughters-in-law into their home, did not 
invite their Bergholz children to the wedding of a non-Bergholz son, and publicly 
censured their children at an Amish horse auction.80 
The defense presented the other attacks as variations on the same nonreligious 
theme. Raymond Hershberger was targeted for the role he played in a 2006 custody 
dispute over the two children of Wilma and Aden Troyer after Wilma—Samuel 
Mullet’s daughter—separated from her husband and left the Bergholz community.81 
The defense argued that, had the bishop gathering not reversed the Bergholz 
discipline, including the Bann on Wilma, Wilma and Aden may have reconciled.82 
Because of this interpersonal—but irreligious—conflict, the defendants attacked 
Hershberger.83 Likewise, Myron Miller’s attack could have been the result of 
Miller’s interference with internal Mullet family affairs—in his case, the aid he gave 
to Samuel Mullet’s son Bill after Bill parted with Mullet and Bergholz.84 
Additionally, Miller also told Bill to return a horse and buggy—gifts from his 
father—to Bergholz, and this could have been perceived by Mullet as a personal 
insult, not a religious affront.85 Finally, Melvin and Anna Shrock, similarly to Martin 
and Barbara Miller, were attacked only by family members, so the attack may have 
been the result of familial discord—aggravated by the parents’ decision to arrive 
escorted by local law enforcement—distinct from any religious motivation.86 
C. Litigation 
1. Trial 
A federal grand jury charged sixteen members of the Bergholz community in a 
ten-count indictment issued in March 2012.87 The defendants were accused of federal 
hate crimes and other ancillary crimes.88 The defendants moved to dismiss the 
                                                                                                                 
 
one religion to another, or religion to irreligion”). 
 79. See Miller, 767 F.3d at 594. 
 80. Id. at 595. 
 81. Id. at 597. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See id. at 597–98. 
 84. Id. at 598. The Mullet family/Bergholz community distinction is hard to draw, largely 
because almost all of the community at the time of the attacks was related to Samuel Mullet 
by blood or marriage. KRAYBILL, supra note 4, at 40. Of the sixteen defendants, only Levi F. 
Miller had no familial connection to Mullet. Id. at 104. 
 85. Miller, 767 F.3d at 598–99. 
 86. Id. at 596–97. 
 87. United States v. Mullet, 868 F. Supp. 2d 618, 620 (N.D. Ohio 2012), rev’d sub nom. 
United States v. Miller, 767 F.3d 585 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 88. Id. at 620 & n.2. Concise tables of the charges and against whom they were brought 
can be found in KRAYBILL, supra note 4, at 103–04. 
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charges and presented three arguments to support their motion: the HCPA exceeds 
Congress’s Commerce Clause power, the HCPA infringes the defendants’ First 
Amendment rights protecting religion and expression, and Congress did not intend 
the HCPA to apply to intrareligious acts.89 All three arguments failed. The 
Commerce Clause argument failed because the HCPA includes a jurisdictional 
element that “requires the Government to allege and prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt a jurisdictional nexus,” which must explicitly connect the actions at issue to 
interstate commerce.90 Here, the use of the United States Postal Service to lure the 
Shrocks to Bergholz, the defendants’ travel on highways to get to other victims, and 
the interstate travel of the shearing instruments provided the nexus needed under the 
Commerce Clause.91 The First Amendment argument failed because “[t]he First 
Amendment does not protect violence,”92 and because the religion of the defendants 
was irrelevant—it is the religion of the victims that triggers the HCPA.93 Finally, the 
district judge noted that “history is replete with examples of internecine violence” 
and “in the absence of any language suggesting [intragroup violence is not covered 
by the HCPA], the Court is not going to create such an exception.”94 
At trial, the defense and prosecution presented different proposed jury instructions 
regarding the term “because of” in the HCPA.95 The defendants proposed an 
instruction requiring that the victims’ religion be a but-for cause of the attacks, and 
the prosecution’s proposed instruction—which the court used—required only that 
the victim’s religion be a significant motivating factor.96 The jury found all sixteen 
defendants guilty of conspiracy to violate the HCPA and also found individual 
defendants guilty of additional charges, including direct violations of the HCPA.97 
Samuel Mullet received a fifteen-year prison sentence, while the rest of the 
defendants received sentences ranging from one year and one day to seven years.98 
                                                                                                                 
 
 89. Mullet, 868 F. Supp. 2d at 621. 
 90. Id. at 623. Another district in the Sixth Circuit, the Eastern District of Kentucky, also 
upheld the constitutionality of the HCPA against a Commerce Clause challenge in United 
States v. Jenkins, 909 F. Supp. 2d 758 (E.D. Ky. 2012). The Jenkins court also rejected equal 
protection, substantive due process, and First Amendment challenges to the HCPA’s 
constitutionality. Id. at 764. 
 91. Mullet, 868 F. Supp. 2d at 623. 
 92. Id. (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982)). 
Claiborne’s declaration that violence is not a protected exercise of religion is also a reason 
why a claim that the HCPA violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, raised in an 
amicus brief, fails. Id. at 624. 
 93. Id. at 623. 
 94. Id. at 624; cf. R Zachary Karanovich, Note, Say What You Need to Say: A Concurring 
Opinion Regarding Intra-Religious Hate Crimes After the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, 
Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act and United States v. Mullet, 47 IND. L. REV. 565 (2014) 
(arguing that, instead of determining whether intragroup violence is covered under the HCPA, 
differences and distinctions between the victim and offender should be used to show that they 
are members of separate groups—even if that places them in groups of one). 
 95. See United States v. Miller, 767 F.3d 585, 589 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 96. Id. 
 97. See id. 
 98. Trip Gabriel, Amish Sect Leader Sentenced to 15 Years in Hair-Cutting Attacks, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 9, 2013, at A11. 
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2. Appeal 
All sixteen defendants filed appeals for their hate crime convictions.99 During the 
pendency of the appeal, the Supreme Court decided Burrage v. United States,100 
which “provides definitive guidance concerning the appropriate construction of the 
term ‘because of’” in the HCPA, namely that “because of” requires but-for 
causation.101 While the prosecution did not concede that but-for causation is 
required,102 all three judges on the circuit court panel agreed, and no other Sixth 
Circuit judge requested a vote on the prosecution’s request for rehearing en banc.103 
While the dispute between “but-for” causation and “significant motivating factor” 
appeared to be momentarily settled—at least in the Sixth Circuit—the appellate panel 
in Miller did not reach a unanimous decision.104 The difference between the opinions 
lies in which decisions based on the victims’ protected class can render an act a hate 
crime. Judge Sargus, in dissent, looked to the decision to use a particular form of 
attack while the majority looked to the motive behind the decision to attack the 
victims. For Judge Sargus, “[t]he pertinent but-for causality inquiry, then, is whether, 
even if all of the other contributing or but-for factors remained, the prohibited 
conduct (the beard and hair cutting) would have occurred but for or in the absence of 
the victims’ Amish religion.”105 On the other hand, Judge Sutton’s majority opinion 
holds that “[f]or an assault to be a federal hate crime, the victim’s protected 
characteristic must be a but-for cause behind the defendant’s decision to act.”106 This 
difference led the majority to remand the case for a new trial,107 while the dissent 
would have held that the error in the causation standard was harmless.108 
III. THE FEDERAL HATE CRIME STATUTE AND MODELS OF ANALYSIS  
A. The HCPA’s Namesakes and Legislative History 
The brutal murders of Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. made national 
headlines in 1998,109 eleven years before the passage of the HCPA which bears the 
victims’ names.110 In June of 1998, James Byrd, Jr., a black man, was walking home 
                                                                                                                 
 
 99. Miller, 767 F.3d at 589. 
 100. 134 S. Ct. 881 (2014). 
 101. Miller, 767 F.3d at 603–04 (Sargus, J., dissenting); see also id. at 589 (majority 
opinion). 
 102. Petition of the United States for Rehearing En Banc at 1, Miller, 767 F.3d 585 (No. 
13-3177), ECF No. 105. 
 103. Order, Miller, 767 F.3d 585 (No. 13-3177), ECF No. 109. Judge Sargus, however, 
would have granted  rehearing based on the reasoning in his dissent. Miller, 767 F.3d at 586. 
 104. Miller, 767 F.3d at 588. 
 105. Id. at 605 (Sargus, J., dissenting). 
 106. Id. at 594. 
 107. Id. at 602. 
 108. Id. at 603. 
 109. JENNIFER PETERSEN, MURDER, THE MEDIA, AND THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC FEELINGS: 
REMEMBERING MATTHEW SHEPARD AND JAMES BYRD JR. 1 (2011). 
 110. Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-84, §§ 4701–13, 123 Stat. 2190, 2835–44 (2009). 
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when he was offered a ride by three white men. The men beat Byrd, tied him to their 
vehicle, and dragged him—initially still conscious—for over two miles.111 Byrd’s 
killers left his headless body near a predominantly black church in a black 
neighborhood.112 The placement of Byrd’s body, the nature of his murder, the content 
of the killers’ tattoos, and the killers’ possession of white supremacist literature led 
to the murder’s designation as a hate crime.113 
On an evening in October of the same year, Matthew Shepard, who was openly 
gay, left a bar with two men. The two men took Shepard’s wallet and shoes before 
beating him with a pistol butt and leaving him tied to a fence.114 Shepard was still 
alive when found the next day by a mountain biker who first thought Shepard’s 
battered body was a scarecrow.115 Shepard succumbed to his injuries five days 
later.116 While the then-current hate crime law did not cover crimes motivated by the 
victim’s sexual orientation,117 evidence presented at trial suggests the killers’ animus 
toward Shepard’s sexual orientation motivated the attack: Shepard was kicked 
repeatedly in his groin, and one attacker taunted Shepard by saying, “It’s Gay 
Awareness Week.”118 
                                                                                                                 
 
 111. PETERSEN, supra note 109, at 94. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 24. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. See H.R. REP. NO. 111-86, at 5 (2009). 
 118. Kathleen Parker, Editorial, Hate and a Question of Rights, WASH. POST, May 3, 2009, 
at A21. Calling Shepard’s murder a hate crime, however, is not universally accepted. For 
example, Virginia Foxx, a U.S. congresswoman, called the classification of the murder as a 
hate crime a “‘hoax.’” PETERSEN, supra note 109, at 152. Some widely assumed details of the 
case have been called into question. A man who was acquainted with both Shepard and 
attacker Aaron McKinney told reporter Elizabeth Vargas that McKinney himself was bisexual. 
New Details Emerge in Matthew Shepard Murder, ABC NEWS (Nov. 26, 2004), 
http://abcnews.go.com/2020/story?id=277685. While it is possible for intragroup violence to 
be a hate crime, Lisa M. Fairfax, The Thin Line Between Love and Hate: Why Affinity-Based 
Securities and Investment Fraud Constitutes a Hate Crime, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1073, 
1109–15 (2003), McKinney, when also interviewed by Vargas, claimed that on the night of 
the murder he was simply looking for money to support his drug habit. New Details Emerge 
in Matthew Shepard Murder, ABC NEWS (Nov. 26, 2004), http://abcnews.go.com/2020
/story?id=277685. Recently, Stephen Jimenez published a book asserting that Shepard’s 
sexual orientation was not the primary cause of the attack. See STEPHEN JIMENEZ, THE BOOK 
OF MATT: HIDDEN TRUTHS ABOUT THE MURDER OF MATTHEW SHEPARD (2013). The book has 
received much attention from right-wing media. John Kruzel, Matthew Shepard’s Enduring 
Legacy, SLATE (Oct. 3, 2013), http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2013/10/03/even_if
_matthew_shepard_s_murder_wasn_t_a_hate_crime_the_legislation_that.html. If, in fact, 
Shepard was not chosen as a victim because of his sexual orientation, then the kicks to 
Shepard’s groin are evidence that point toward the possible conclusion that the method of 
attack was chosen because of Shepard’s sexual orientation. If the method of attack was chosen 
due to Shepard’s sexual orientation, the attack would be considered a hate crime under the 
supplemental analysis this Note endorses (assuming, counterfactually, that the attack had taken 
place after sexual orientation received recognition as a protected characteristic). See infra 
notes 137–140 and accompanying text. 
1720 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 90:1707 
 
Outcry after these murders led Congress to expand the federal government’s 
ability to address hate crimes by updating the federal hate crime statute.119 The 
change was not immediate, however. Nine years after the attacks on Shepard and 
Byrd, a hate crime bill passed both houses as a rider to a 2008 defense appropriations 
bill,120 but President Bush vetoed the bill, citing foreign policy and commercial 
interests related to the reconstruction of Iraq.121 In 2009, the HCPA, once again 
attached to a defense appropriations bill, was signed into law by President Obama.122 
The new HCPA expanded protection to crimes based on sexual orientation, gender, 
gender identity, and disability and replaced the federally protected activity 
requirement with a new Commerce Clause hook.123 
Hate crime statutes increase punishment for crimes committed against victims 
because of their protected characteristics.124 Despite opponents’ arguments that this 
singles out certain members of the population for special protection,125 everybody 
has a race, a gender, a sexual orientation, and—including atheism and agnosticism—
a religion.126 Hate crime statutes are the result of legislatures determining that 
defendants who consider a victim’s protected class in carrying out a crime are 
deserving of increased punishment.127 
B. Hate Crime Statute Models 
There are three main categories of causation standards used in hate crime statutes: 
“racial animus,” “discriminatory selection,” and “because of.”128 The “racial animus” 
model—perhaps an outdated term now that most statutes protect many more 
categories than race from hate crimes—requires a showing of hatred, animus, 
prejudice, or the like for conviction.129 For example, Florida increases the severity of 
a crime “if the commission of such felony or misdemeanor evidences prejudice based 
                                                                                                                 
 
 119. See Karanovich, supra note 94, at 569; Lisa Kye Young Kim, Comment, The Matthew 
Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Act: The Interplay of the Judiciary and Congress 
in Suspect Classification Analysis, 12 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 495, 496 (2011). 
 120. Matthew Shepard Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, H.R. 
1585, 110th Cong. § 1023 (2007), 153 CONG. REC. 26,536 (2007). 
 121. GEORGE W. BUSH, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
TRANSMITTING NOTIFICATION OF THE VETO OF H.R. 1585, THE “NATIONAL DEFENSE 
AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008,” H.R. Doc. No. 110-88 (2008). 
 122. Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-84, §§ 4701–13, 123 Stat. 2190, 2835–44 (2009) (rider to the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010). 
 123. Kim, supra note 119, at 496–97, 498 n.26. Classifications that are badges or incidents 
of slavery do not require this Commerce Clause hook and fall under federal purview due to 
the Thirteenth Amendment. See 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1)–(2) (2012) (excepting “[o]ffenses 
involving actual or perceived race [or] color” from the interstate commerce requirement). 
 124. 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 2107 (2006). 
 125. See PETERSEN, supra note 109, at 77–82. 
 126. See supra note 78. 
 127. See FREDERICK M. LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE: BIAS CRIMES UNDER AMERICAN 
LAW 45–63 (1999). 
 128. Ramer, supra note 12, at 93 (citing LAWRENCE, supra note 13, at 30). 
 129. LAWRENCE, supra note 13, at 34. 
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on the race, color, ancestry, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, national origin, 
homeless status, mental or physical disability, or advanced age of the victim.”130 
Another is the “discriminatory selection” model, which requires that the victim’s 
protected characteristic was the reason the victim was chosen but does not require 
showing the perpetrator held any bias toward that characteristic.131 Wisconsin’s 
penalty enhancement statute follows this model: the maximum sentence is increased 
when the perpetrator “[i]ntentionally selects the [victim] . . . in whole or in part 
because of the actor’s belief or perception regarding the race, religion, color, 
disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry” of the victim.132 
The third model is the “because of” model, which is sometimes also worded as “by 
reason of.”133 This model is the most common form in use, and it is the model the HCPA 
follows.134 Its meaning is also less certain than the other models; it does not preclude use 
of either of the other models, nor does it mandate adoption of their analyses.135 In the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 130. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.085(1)(a) (West Supp. 2015) (emphasis added); see also R.I. 
GEN. LAWS § 12-19-38 (2002) (providing sentencing enhancement for crimes committed 
“because of the actor’s hatred or animus toward the actual or perceived disability, religion, 
color, race, national origin or ancestry, sexual orientation, or gender of” the victim). 
 131. LAWRENCE, supra note 13, at 30. Professor Frederick M. Lawrence gives the 
following example: “[C]onsider the mugger who preys solely upon white victims because he 
believes that white people, on average, carry more money than nonwhites. He . . . has selected 
his victim on the basis of race but has done so without bias motivation.” Id. 
 132. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.645(1)(b) (West 2005). The Supreme Court upheld this statute 
despite a First Amendment challenge in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993). See also 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1304(a)(2) (Supp. 2014) (declaring that a person who commits a 
crime and intentionally “[s]elects the victim because of the victim’s race, religion, color, 
disability, sexual orientation, gender identity, national origin or ancestry, shall be guilty of a 
hate crime”). 
 133. LAWRENCE, supra note 13, at 35–36. 
 134. 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2) (2012) (providing for enhanced penalties for someone who 
“willfully causes bodily injury . . . because of” a protected classification); LAWRENCE, supra 
note 13, at 35–36. 
 135. See LAWRENCE, supra note 13, at 37 (“Classification of because of bias crime statutes 
is thus made difficult by the fact that these laws are consistent with either the discriminatory 
selection model or the racial animus model.” (emphasis in original)). But see JAMES B. JACOBS 
& KIMBERLY POTTER, HATE CRIMES: CRIMINAL LAW & IDENTITY POLITICS 32 (1998) (arguing 
“because of” hate crime statutes would likely require class prejudice instead of mere class 
consciousness “because [prosecutors and judges] recognize the legislative intent to penalize 
prejudice”). The HCPA’s legislative history is replete with references to the perpetrator’s bias, 
but no animus requirement made it into the statutory text. For example, the House Judiciary 
Committee report reads: “Hate crimes involve the purposeful selection of victims for violence 
and intimidation based on their perceived attributes; they are a violent and dangerous 
manifestation of prejudice against identifiable groups.” H.R. REP. NO. 111-86, at 5 (2009) 
(emphasis added). This report further clarifies Congress’s intent that the proposed legislation 
be used to “provide[] the Federal Government the tools to effectively pursue the significant 
Federal interest in eradicating bias-motivated violence.” Id. at 6 (emphasis added). Perhaps the 
strongest language is housed in the legal analysis done to assuage federalism concerns: 
[T]he bill requires proof that the violence be motivated by animus based on actual 
or perceived sexual orientation, gender, gender identity, or disability. This 
statutory animus requirement, which the Government must prove beyond a 
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Mullet appeal, neither the majority nor the dissent considered the racial animus analysis. 
The majority adopted the discriminatory selection model analysis, and the dissent would 
have used a supplemental analysis not found in either model: method of attack.136 
The “method of attack” model Judge Sargus endorses involves a broader 
application of “because of.” The HCPA imposes criminal liability on whomever 
“willfully causes bodily injury to any person . . . because of the actual or perceived” 
protected class of the victim.137 Where the discriminatory selection model only 
applies “because of” to victim selection, Judge Sargus’s model applies “because of” 
to the method of attack that led to the bodily injury.138 According to Sargus’s model, 
where a defendant attacks his or her victim in a manner chosen specifically because 
of the victim’s protected class, the particular bodily injury occurred because of the 
victim’s protected class. The requirement of but-for causation remains the same: the 
difference turns on whether the protected class is a but-for cause of this specific 
bodily injury (method of attack model)139 or a but-for cause of bodily injury to this 
specific person (discriminatory selection model).140 
                                                                                                                 
 
reasonable doubt, will limit the pool of potential Federal cases to those in which 
the evidence of bias motivation is sufficient to distinguish them from ordinary 
crimes of violence left to State prosecution. 
Id. at 14 (emphasis added). The report makes specific reference here to sexual orientation, 
gender, gender identity, and disability because those are the protected classes new to the 
HCPA. The text of both the HCPA as passed and the bill include religion in this category. 18 
U.S.C. § 249(a)(2); H.R. REP. NO. 111-86, at 3–4 (draft of the proposed bill). 
Despite these statements in the legislative history, however, reading an animus requirement 
into “because of” is a remote possibility due to the Burrage opinion. Burrage definitively 
determined that the phrase “because of” means but-for causation in criminal contexts. Burrage 
v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881, 887–92 (2014). Burrage abated the need to reference 
legislative history. Although “because of” in the HCPA received a couple different 
interpretations pre-Burrage, none of these interpretations included an animus requirement. See 
United States v. Miller, 767 F.3d 585, 589 (6th Cir. 2014) (post-Burrage reversal of trial 
court’s pre-Burrage use of “a significant motivating factor” in jury instructions); United States 
v. Jenkins, No. 12-15-GFVT, 2013 WL 3338650, at *6 (E.D. Ky. July 2, 2013), aff'd, Nos. 
13-5902 & 13-5903 (6th Cir. 2014) (giving jury instruction that the protected category must 
be “the substantial reason” for selecting the victim); Jury Instructions at 12–13, United States 
v. Mason (D. Or. Feb. 3, 2014) (No. 3:13-cr-00298-01-SI), 2014 WL 986662 (instructing jury 
that protected category must be “but for” cause for selecting the victim). But see United States 
v. McGee, 173 F.3d 952, 957 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding racial animus as “a substantial reason” 
to be a sufficient—though not a necessary—condition to satisfy the causation requirement in 
the HCPA’s predecessor). In addition to referring to a different statute than the HCPA, McGee 
is not controlling because the defendant did not argue that he did not have animus; his 
argument was that the victim’s intoxication gave the defendant a legitimate reason to deny the 
victim entrance to the club. See id. Animus as a causation requirement was not litigated. 
 136. See Miller, 767 F.3d at 595–96. 
 137. 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)(A). 
 138. Miller, 767 F.3d at 603 (Sargus, J., dissenting). 
 139. “The pertinent but-for causality inquiry, then, is whether, even if all of the other 
contributing or but-for factors remained, the prohibited conduct (the beard and hair cutting) 
would have occurred but for or in the absence of the victims’ Amish religion.” Id. at 605 
(emphasis added). 
 140. Id. at 591 (majority opinion) (agreeing with the defense that “the phrase ‘because of’ 
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The case of United States v. Epstein provides further illustration of this nuance.141 
The defendants in Epstein were arrested as the result of a sting operation undertaken 
in response to reports of the kidnapping and torture of Orthodox Jewish men.142 
Specifically, the reports described attacks on recalcitrant husbands carried out in 
order for each husband’s wife to obtain a get—a religious divorce—from her 
uncooperative spouse.143 The defendants are charged with committing federal 
kidnapping crimes, though, not with violating the HCPA.144 These attacks are more 
distinctly driven by interpersonal conflict, even though that conflict concerns a 
religious ceremony. The motivation for the attacks is the husbands’ refusal to deliver 
the get, not the husbands’ Jewish identity. Although it is difficult to imagine anyone 
outside the Jewish faith being asked to deliver a get and refusing to do so, there is no 
indication that the defendants would not have committed the same acts against an 
outsider. Suppose, however, that the defendants had chosen to cut their victims’ 
payot—their religiously mandated sidelocks—or force-feed them pork products. The 
motivation behind the decision to attack remains the same, but now the attackers 
have taken the victims’ religion into account when carrying out the alleged acts in 
order to intentionally cause religious offense. 
IV. THE ARGUMENT FOR EXPANSION 
In arguing that the method of attack model should be adopted to supplement the 
racial animus and discriminatory selection models, it is important to ground this new 
model in the framework traditionally provided to justify increased punishment for 
hate crimes. As a foundational matter, punishment for a crime must be proportional 
to the offense.145 Therefore, hate crimes under the method of attack model should 
show at least the same level of seriousness as the other hate crime models.146 
“The seriousness of a crime . . . is a function of the offender’s culpability and the 
harm caused.”147 Under culpability analysis, hate crime offenders are more 
blameworthy because their motivation “violates the equality principle, one of the 
most deeply held tenets in our legal system and our culture. To the extent that crime 
seriousness is designed to capture a deontological concept of blameworthiness, bias 
crimes are more serious than other crimes.”148 Under the discriminatory selection 
model, no ill will toward any protected class is required, only selection because of 
that class.149 If added hate crime punishment is available as a result of assuming 
something positive about a protected class—perhaps that the members have more 
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valuable possessions to steal150—then taking protected class into account in order to 
cause especial harm should be at least as offensive to the societal value placed on 
equality. Both offend the same equality principle by considering protected classes in 
making criminal decisions.  
Under harms analysis, hate crimes under the discriminatory selection and racial 
animus models are deemed worthy of increased punishment because of increased 
harm in the form of psychological damage to victims and feelings of threat that 
extend to the entire class.151 This increased harm is evident in the aftermath of the 
Bergholz attacks. All of the male victims testified that, after their beards were cut, they 
avoided public appearance due to embarrassment.152 “Beard cutting was a clever way 
of doing short-term damage that struck at the heart of Amish identity and caused 
several months of public embarrassment.”153 On the class level, fear spread throughout 
Amish communities, leading individuals to carry pepper spray, keep shotguns loaded, 
and entirely avoid being out of doors at night.154 The Amish have been targeted as 
victims before,155 but these are the attacks that led them to take action. 
After establishing why it is proportional to add method of attack analysis to hate 
crime determinations, it also must be established that the HCPA includes protection 
of this model. The language of the HCPA is broad—unlike some statutes, it uses 
neither the “racial animus” model nor the “discriminatory selection” model.156 
Furthermore, it does not add a “maliciousness” requirement, a common add-on to 
“because of” statutes that points toward use of the racial animus model of analysis.157 
Additionally, the HCPA was intended to be an expansion of coverage, as evidenced 
by the broad Commerce Clause wording and the removal of the federally protected 
activity requirement.158 Congress has not precluded the use of “method of attack” 
analysis under the HCPA. A reading of the HCPA text itself does not restrict the 
reading of “because of” to apply only to a currently recognized model: to “willfully 
cause[] bodily injury to any person . . . because of the actual or perceived religion” 
of the victim should cover crimes where the religion of the victim is the but-for cause 
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of that specific bodily injury.159 As Judge Sargus noted, “[T]he majority has adopted 
an unduly restrictive interpretation of the statute.”160 
Like the currently recognized hate crime analyses, method-of-attack hate 
crimes indicate heightened blameworthiness and harm caused over their 
non-hate-crime analogs. Given that inclusion of method-of-attack hate crimes is 
a plausible reading of the HCPA’s text that satisfies proportionality of 
punishment, it ought to be a supplemental analysis available in establishing that 
a hate crime under the HCPA occurred. 
However, to avoid reaching an absurd result, this expansion should not be 
extended when an attacker chooses a different mode of attack in order to avoid 
causing especial offense based on a protected class. For example, imagine 
anti-abortion activists who throw animal blood on doctors who perform abortions. 
Further suppose these activists normally use pig’s blood, but when attacking Jewish 
or Muslim victims, they switch to a different animal’s blood. In this case, the victims’ 
religion led the attackers to choose a different method of attack, but this change was 
made in order to honor the victims’ protected class, not to inflict harm particular to 
that protected class. Such decisions ought not raise the actions to the level of hate 
crime because the decision derived from the victims’ protected class led to a less 
offensive attack. 
CONCLUSION 
The prosecution of the Bergholz defendants can hardly be considered a typical 
case. It involves allegedly intrareligious violence within an insular religious group, 
and the violence at issue would not be typically seen as particularly egregious outside 
of the victims’ religion. While the Mullet trial court used an incorrect causation 
standard, the proper, but-for causation standard should be considered satisfied not 
only if the victims’ religion was the but-for cause of victim selection but also if the 
victims’ religion was the but-for cause of the method of attack. 
The religious symbolism of the method of attack employed by the Bergholz 
defendants must be understood in order to make sense of why the HCPA’s protection 
should extend to this case. To the uninformed outsider, interpreting beard and hair 
trimming as a hate crime can be viewed as a gross misuse of the justice system’s time 
and effort.161 “If the assaults were simply a grown-up version of Amish pranks, were 
they worthy of the attention and resources of an outside system of justice?”162 The 
inherently religious nature of the specific method of attack chosen, however, 
removes these actions from the realm of mere prank. While haircutting may not be 
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particularly hurtful to the average person, it violates a long-held and much-valued 
religious tradition in the Amish faith.163 The Bergholz defendants “attacked [the 
victims’] way of life by robbing them of an outward appearance meant to express 
their faith and closeness to God.”164 The defendants asserted their superiority “by 
launching an attack steeped in religious significance, which they knew would shake 
their devout victims more than any other mode of attack.”165 Even assuming that the 
victims were not chosen because of their religion, the attacks were not devoid of 
decision making based on the victims’ religion.166 
The HCPA’s scope reaches crimes committed against victims because they are 
members of a protected class, and excluding the decision to use a method of attack 
particularly offensive to a protected class cuts against the broad wording of the HCPA’s 
text.167 Congress expressed no intention to espouse either the discriminatory selection 
or racial animus model of hate crime analysis. While the “because of” construction has 
generally been considered to include one or both of the other two models,168 there is no 
obligation to restrict it to only these two models. Having chosen a victim for reasons 
outside of the HCPA’s scope, a defendant should not be allowed to cause harm directed 
specifically at the victim’s protected class and avoid the HCPA’s reach. 
Ultimately, whether the members of the Bergholz community chose to attack their 
specific victims because of the victims’ religion is a question of fact. That a crime was 
committed is clear, but whether the selection of the victims satisfies the requirements of 
the federal hate crime statute remains unresolved; the basis of the dispute may or may 
not be religious. Without a doubt, however, the method of attack chosen by the 
defendants is full of religious symbolism, and the defense failed to show that such 
actions would have been taken against non-Amish victims. The HCPA’s broad wording 
should encompass the supplemental method of establishing causation—method of 
attack—which mandates conviction of the Bergholz defendants. 
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